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Epistemological Premises How Much Science in Computer Science & MAS?
What is Science in Computer Science?
A general definition of scientific activity might be not enough
Hard & soft sciences typically deal with worlds that are given, and
have to be understood, modelled, and possibly predicted in their
behaviour
“Computational worlds” have to be both modelled and constructed
Concepts, methods, and tools from other sciences, and from
“classical” epistemological approaches are surely essential, but might
not suffice
What is peculiar to Computer Science?
Formal models should follow the same “lines” as, say, mathematical
or logical formalisations
Models of the physical systems should follow the same approach as,
say, models in Physics
However, the core of computational systems is human-designed, and
obeys to human-conceived laws—unlike, say, physical or biological
systems
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Epistemological Premises How Much Science in Computer Science & MAS?
On the Notion of Definition
Out of the mess
Many different & diverging definition for the notion of agent around
Typically, a list of not well-defined properties
“Definitory” properties are often indistinguishable from desirable ones
Orthogonality between defining features is not even considered
How should one choose / build a definition?
We should first make clear what are the required / desirable
properties of a definition
Only after, try to define our entities
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Epistemological Premises On the Notion of Definition
What is a Definition?
From Wikipedia
A definition is a form of words (definiens) which states the meaning
of a term (definiendum)
Definition by genus and differentia
genus (the family) of things to which the defined thing belongs
differentia the features that distinguish the defined thing from
other things of the same family
Rules for definition by genus and differentia
A definition must set out the essential attributes of the thing defined
Definitions should avoid circularity
The definition must not be too wide or too narrow
The definition must not be obscure
A definition should not be negative where it can be positive
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Epistemological Premises On the Notion of Definition
Explanation in the Sciences of Nature
Occam’s Razor
The explanation of any phenomenon should make as few assumptions
as possible, eliminating, or “shaving off,” those that make no
difference in the observable predictions of the explanatory hypothesis
or theory
In short, when given two equally valid explanations for a phenomenon,
one should embrace the less complicated formulation
When multiple competing theories have equal predictive powers, one
should select the one introducing the fewest assumptions and
postulating the fewest hypothetical entities
Lex Parsimoniae
Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem
(entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity)
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Epistemological Premises On the Notion of Definition
Definition in the Sciences of Artificial
Explanation vs. definition
In the sciences of nature, phenomena are just to be observed,
described, and possibly predicted, and noumena to be possibly
understood
definition is just a premise to theory and explanation, to build up
models for natural systems
In the sciences of artificial, noumena are to be created
definition is the foundation for systems, and gives structure to artificial
worlds
there, Occam’s Razor and the Lex Parsimoniae may apply to definition
instead of theory and explanation
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Epistemological Premises On the Notion of Definition
Lessons Learned: Definition by Genus and Differentia
Some rules of thumb
genus A definition should clearly delimit the domain of discourse
differentia A definition should allow what is in and what is out to be
clearly determined
rules A definition should follow the rules for definition by genus
and differentia
essentiality, no circularity, neither wide nor narrow, no
obscurity, no unneeded negativity
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Epistemological Premises On the Notion of Definition
Lessons Learned: Occam’s Razor & Lex Parsimoniae
Other rules of thumb
minimal assumptions A definition of an entity should make as few
assumptions as possible
minimal complication Given two equally valid definitions for an entity, one
should embrace the less complicated formulation
lex parsimoniae Definitions should not be multiplied beyond necessity
definitory features should not be multiplied beyond
necessity
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomy as the Foundation of the Definition of Agent
Lex Parsimoniae: Autonomy
Autonomy as the only fundamental and definitory feature of agents
Let us see whether other typical agent features follow / descend from
this somehow
Computational Autonomy
Agents are autonomous as they encapsulate (the thread of) control
Control does not pass through agent boundaries
only data (knowledge, information) crosses agent boundaries
Agents have no interface, cannot be controlled, nor can they be
invoked
Looking at agents, MAS can be conceived as an aggregation of
multiple distinct loci of control interacting with each other by
exchanging information
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
(Autonomous) Agents (Pro-)Act
Action as the essence of agency
The etimology of the word agent is from the Latin agens
So, agent means “the one who acts”
Any coherent notion of agency should naturally come equipped with a
model for agent actions
Autonomous agents are pro-active
Agents are literally active
Autonomous agents encapsulate control, and the rule to govern it
→ Autonomous agents are pro-active by definition
where pro-activity means “making something happen”, rather than
waiting for something to happen
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Agents are Situated
The model of action depends on the context
Any “ground” model of action is strictly coupled with the context
where the action takes place
An agent comes with its own model of action
Any agent is then strictly coupled with the environment where it lives
and (inter)acts
Agents are in this sense are intrinsically situated
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Are Agents Reactive?
Situatedness and reactivity come hand in hand
Any model of action is strictly coupled with the context where the
action takes place
Any action model requires an adequate representation of the world
Any effective representation of the world requires a suitable balance
between environment perception and representation
→ Any effective action model requires a suitable balance between
environment perception and representation
however, any non-trivial action model requires some form of perception
of the environment—so as to check action pre-conditions, or to verify
the effects of actions on the environment
Agents in this sense are supposedly reactive to change
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Are Autonomous Agents Reactive?
Reactivity as a (deliberate) reduction of proactivity
An autonomous agent could be built / choose to merely react to
external events
It may just wait for something to happen, either as a permanent
attitude, or as a temporary opportunistic choice
In this sense, autonomous agents may also be reactive
Reactivity to change
Reactivity to (environment) change is a different notion
This mainly comes from early AI failures, and from robotics
It stems from agency, rather than from autonomy—as discussed in
the previous slide
However, this issue will be even clearer when facing the issue of
artifacts and environment design
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
(Autonomous) Agents Change the World
Action, change & environment
Whatever the model, any model for action brings along the notion of
change
an agent acts to change something around in the MAS
Two admissible targets for change by agent action
agent an agent could act to change the state of another agent
since agents are autonomous, and only data flow among
them, the only way another agent can change their state
is by providing them with some information
change to other agents essentially involves
communication actions
environment an agent could act to change the state of the
environment
change to the environment requires pragmatical actions
which could be either physical or virtual depending on
the nature of the environment
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change to other agents essentially involves
communication actions
environment an agent could act to change the state of the
environment
change to the environment requires pragmatical actions
which could be either physical or virtual depending on
the nature of the environment
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individual is immersed in a society
autonomy does not make sense for an individual in isolation
no individual alone could be properly said to be autonomous
This also straightforwardly explain why any program in any sequential
programming language is not an autonomous agent per se
[Graesser, 1996, Odell, 2002]
Autonomous agents live in a MAS
Single-agent systems do not exist in principle
Autonomous agents live and interact within agent societies & MAS
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Autonomous Agents are Interactive
Interactivity follows, too
Since agents are subsystems of a MAS, they interact within the global
system
by essence of systems in general, rather than of MAS
Since agents are autonomous, only data (knowledge, information)
crosses agent boundaries
Information & knowledge is exchanged between agents
leading to more complex patterns than message passing between
objects
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 20 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents are Interactive
Interactivity follows, too
Since agents are subsystems of a MAS, they interact within the global
system
by essence of systems in general, rather than of MAS
Since agents are autonomous, only data (knowledge, information)
crosses agent boundaries
Information & knowledge is exchanged between agents
leading to more complex patterns than message passing between
objects
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 20 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents are Interactive
Interactivity follows, too
Since agents are subsystems of a MAS, they interact within the global
system
by essence of systems in general, rather than of MAS
Since agents are autonomous, only data (knowledge, information)
crosses agent boundaries
Information & knowledge is exchanged between agents
leading to more complex patterns than message passing between
objects
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 20 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents are Interactive
Interactivity follows, too
Since agents are subsystems of a MAS, they interact within the global
system
by essence of systems in general, rather than of MAS
Since agents are autonomous, only data (knowledge, information)
crosses agent boundaries
Information & knowledge is exchanged between agents
leading to more complex patterns than message passing between
objects
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 20 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents are Interactive
Interactivity follows, too
Since agents are subsystems of a MAS, they interact within the global
system
by essence of systems in general, rather than of MAS
Since agents are autonomous, only data (knowledge, information)
crosses agent boundaries
Information & knowledge is exchanged between agents
leading to more complex patterns than message passing between
objects
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 20 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents are Interactive
Interactivity follows, too
Since agents are subsystems of a MAS, they interact within the global
system
by essence of systems in general, rather than of MAS
Since agents are autonomous, only data (knowledge, information)
crosses agent boundaries
Information & knowledge is exchanged between agents
leading to more complex patterns than message passing between
objects
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 20 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents Do not Need Exactly a Goal
Agents govern MAS computation
By encapsulating control, agents are the main forces governing and
pushing computation, and determining behaviour in a MAS
Along with control, agent should then encapsulate the criterion for
regulating the thread(s) of control
Autonomy as self-regulation
The term “autonomy”, at its very roots, means self-government,
self-regulation, self-determination
“internal unit invocation” [Odell, 2002]
This does not imply in any way that agents needs to have a goal, or a
task, to be such—to be an agent, then
However, this does imply that autonomy captures the cases of
goal-oriented and task-oriented agents
where goals and tasks play the role of the criteria for governing control
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 21 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents Do not Need Exactly a Goal
Agents govern MAS computation
By encapsulating control, agents are the main forces governing and
pushing computation, and determining behaviour in a MAS
Along with control, agent should then encapsulate the criterion for
regulating the thread(s) of control
Autonomy as self-regulation
The term “autonomy”, at its very roots, means self-government,
self-regulation, self-determination
“internal unit invocation” [Odell, 2002]
This does not imply in any way that agents needs to have a goal, or a
task, to be such—to be an agent, then
However, this does imply that autonomy captures the cases of
goal-oriented and task-oriented agents
where goals and tasks play the role of the criteria for governing control
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 21 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents Do not Need Exactly a Goal
Agents govern MAS computation
By encapsulating control, agents are the main forces governing and
pushing computation, and determining behaviour in a MAS
Along with control, agent should then encapsulate the criterion for
regulating the thread(s) of control
Autonomy as self-regulation
The term “autonomy”, at its very roots, means self-government,
self-regulation, self-determination
“internal unit invocation” [Odell, 2002]
This does not imply in any way that agents needs to have a goal, or a
task, to be such—to be an agent, then
However, this does imply that autonomy captures the cases of
goal-oriented and task-oriented agents
where goals and tasks play the role of the criteria for governing control
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 21 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents Do not Need Exactly a Goal
Agents govern MAS computation
By encapsulating control, agents are the main forces governing and
pushing computation, and determining behaviour in a MAS
Along with control, agent should then encapsulate the criterion for
regulating the thread(s) of control
Autonomy as self-regulation
The term “autonomy”, at its very roots, means self-government,
self-regulation, self-determination
“internal unit invocation” [Odell, 2002]
This does not imply in any way that agents needs to have a goal, or a
task, to be such—to be an agent, then
However, this does imply that autonomy captures the cases of
goal-oriented and task-oriented agents
where goals and tasks play the role of the criteria for governing control
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 21 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents Do not Need Exactly a Goal
Agents govern MAS computation
By encapsulating control, agents are the main forces governing and
pushing computation, and determining behaviour in a MAS
Along with control, agent should then encapsulate the criterion for
regulating the thread(s) of control
Autonomy as self-regulation
The term “autonomy”, at its very roots, means self-government,
self-regulation, self-determination
“internal unit invocation” [Odell, 2002]
This does not imply in any way that agents needs to have a goal, or a
task, to be such—to be an agent, then
However, this does imply that autonomy captures the cases of
goal-oriented and task-oriented agents
where goals and tasks play the role of the criteria for governing control
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 21 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents Do not Need Exactly a Goal
Agents govern MAS computation
By encapsulating control, agents are the main forces governing and
pushing computation, and determining behaviour in a MAS
Along with control, agent should then encapsulate the criterion for
regulating the thread(s) of control
Autonomy as self-regulation
The term “autonomy”, at its very roots, means self-government,
self-regulation, self-determination
“internal unit invocation” [Odell, 2002]
This does not imply in any way that agents needs to have a goal, or a
task, to be such—to be an agent, then
However, this does imply that autonomy captures the cases of
goal-oriented and task-oriented agents
where goals and tasks play the role of the criteria for governing control
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 21 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents Do not Need Exactly a Goal
Agents govern MAS computation
By encapsulating control, agents are the main forces governing and
pushing computation, and determining behaviour in a MAS
Along with control, agent should then encapsulate the criterion for
regulating the thread(s) of control
Autonomy as self-regulation
The term “autonomy”, at its very roots, means self-government,
self-regulation, self-determination
“internal unit invocation” [Odell, 2002]
This does not imply in any way that agents needs to have a goal, or a
task, to be such—to be an agent, then
However, this does imply that autonomy captures the cases of
goal-oriented and task-oriented agents
where goals and tasks play the role of the criteria for governing control
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 21 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Autonomous Agents Do not Need Exactly a Goal
Agents govern MAS computation
By encapsulating control, agents are the main forces governing and
pushing computation, and determining behaviour in a MAS
Along with control, agent should then encapsulate the criterion for
regulating the thread(s) of control
Autonomy as self-regulation
The term “autonomy”, at its very roots, means self-government,
self-regulation, self-determination
“internal unit invocation” [Odell, 2002]
This does not imply in any way that agents needs to have a goal, or a
task, to be such—to be an agent, then
However, this does imply that autonomy captures the cases of
goal-oriented and task-oriented agents
where goals and tasks play the role of the criteria for governing control
Andrea Omicini (Universita` di Bologna) Agents A.Y. 2009/2010 21 / 32
Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Autonomy
Goal-/Task-Orientedness is not a Definitory Feature for
Agents
Example: finite-state automaton with encapsulated control
An agent might be a finite-state automaton
Encapsulating control as an independent thread
Equipped with state transition rules
The criteria for the govern of control would there be embodied in
terms of (finite) states and state transition rules
Goal-orientedness and task-orientedness are just possible features for
agents
They are not definitory features anyway
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Definitions
Outline
1 Epistemological Premises
How Much Science in Computer Science & MAS?
On the Notion of Definition
2 Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework
Autonomy
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“Weak” Notion of Agent
Four key qualities [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]
Weak agents are
Autonomous
Proactive
Reactive (to change)
Social
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Definitions
Are Autonomous Agents Intelligent?
Intelligence helps autonomy
Autonomous agents have to self-determine, self-govern, . . .
Intelligence makes it easy for an agent to govern itself
While intelligence is not mandatory for an agent to be autonomous
however, intelligent autonomous agents clearly make sense
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Are Autonomous Agents Mobile?
Mobility is an extreme form of autonomy
Autonomous agents encapsulate control
At the end of the story, control might be independent of the
environment where an agent lives—say, the virtual machine on which
it runs
Mobile autonomous agents clearly make sense
mobility, however, is not required for an agent to be autonomous
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Do Autonomous Agents Learn?
Learning may improve agent autonomy
By learning, autonomous agents may acquire new skills, improve their
practical reasoning, etc.
In short, an autonomous agent could learn how to make a better use
out of its autonomy
Learning autonomous agents clearly make sense
learning, however, is not required for an agent to be autonomous
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Definitions
“Strong” Notion of Agent
Mentalistic notion [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]
Strong agents have mental components such as
Belief
Desire
Intention
Knowledge
. . .
Intelligent agents and mental components
Intelligent autonomous agents are naturally (and quite typically) conceived
as strong agents
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Agents: Definitions & Conceptual Framework Definitions
Summing Up
Definition (Agent)
Agents are autonomous computational entities
genus agents are computational entities
differentia agents are autonomous, in that they encapsulate control
along with a criterion to govern it
Agents are autonomous
From autonomy, many other features stem
autonomous agents are interactive, social, proactive, and situated;
they might have goals or tasks, or be reactive, intelligent, mobile
they live within MAS, and interact with other agents through
communication actions, and with the environment with pragmatical
actions
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